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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The respondent, as a court reporter, sues for a determination
of her status as a State Merit System employee.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Jr., one of the judges of
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, ruled that, as a matter of law, the respondent, as a court
reporter for many years in the Third Judicial District, was a covered
Merit System employee.

The Court reserved for a trial the issue of

damages sustained by the respondent as a result of her dismissal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, for many years, has served as a court reporter
in the Third Judicial District Court. At the request of the The
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, the respondent acted primarily as his
reporter.

After the enactment of the mandatory retirement law, Judge

Faux was required to take retirement on December 31, 1972. Thereafter,
the respondent was discharged as a court reporter in January 1973 by
The Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, District Court Judge and Court Administrator.

Thereafter, the respondent attempted to have the Merit System

Council consider her dismissal, and to grant her the statutory rights
of a Merit System employee.

The Merit System Council refused to con-

sider her case.
The instant action was then commenced in the District Court
of Salt Lake County for a determination of the Merit System status of
the respondent and, after the matter was presented to The Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., he ruled that, as a matter of law, the respondent was a covered employee under the Merit System.
ARGUMENT

•

I

-

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS RULING THAT
COURT REPORTERS ARE MERIT SYSTEM EMPLOYEES, BASED
UPON THE AMENDMENT TO THE MERIT SYSTEM ACT BY THE
LEGISLATURE IN 1971.
The^Legislature of the State of Utah enacted the Merit
System for state employees during the 1965 term of the legislature.
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At that time, they specifically exempted certain classes of employees
from coverage under the Merit System, and in particular exempted
employees of the judiciary from coverage.

Utah Code Annotated,

67-13-6(a)(8) states:
ff

(a) Except as otherwise provided by law or
by rules and regulations promulgated hereunder for
federally aided programs, the following positions
shall be exempt from the merit provisions of this
act:
(8) All members and employees of the judiciary
of the State of Utah and the Attorney General of the
State of Utah, and his staff and District Attorneys
and their staffs.fl
In 1971, the Legislature amended the Merit System Act, and
under the exemptions provisions, deleted what had previously been
subsections (8) which exempted employees of the judiciary of the State
of Utah from coverage under the Merit System, and enacted certain new
sections.

In particular, Title 67-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, had a

subsection (g) added which states:
"All employees of the office of Secretary of
State, the office of State Auditor, the office of
State Treasurer, the office of Attorney General
(excluding attorneys), and employees of the judiciary
who are not exempt by the provisions of this section,
shall be covered by the provisions of the Merit
System."
(emphasis added)
As the amendment affects "employees of the judiciary1', it is
clear that the Legislature had the specific intent to place "employees
of the judiciary" under the Merit System of the State of Utah.

Prior

to the 1971 amendment, "employees of the judiciary" were specifically
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exempted from coverage, whereas, by the 1971 amendment, they were
specifically included in the Merit System.
The appellant, in an attempt to show a continued exclusion,
refers to part of another subparagraph of Title 67-13-6, Utah Code
Annotated, but in doing so refers only to that part of that subsection
that aids its cause.

The subsection referred to, namely, Subsection

(4) of Paragraph (a) of Title 67-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, deals with
a specific exemption as did Subsection (8) of that title prior to the
1971 amendment.

The appellant would ask the Court to believe that the

Legislature spoke of employees of the judiciary in both Subparagraph
(4), and then again in Subparagraph (8). Logical statutory constructioi
would weigh heavily against that contention.
In Subparagraph (4), relied upon by the appellant, there is
a specific need for affirmative action to be taken, and that is the
portion of the subparagraph that the appellant failed to list in its
brief.

For reference the respondent sets out that subsection of

Title 67-13-6 (a), Utah Code Annotated, for a full consideration as
follows:
"(4) Those employees who make final policy
decision, including all heads of department, agencies
and major offices; those heads of subordinate units
whose duties have a direct and substantial effect
on the public relations of the State Administration
generally; those employees whose regular duties include public advocacy in defense of administration
policy; and those in a personal and confidential
relationship to elected officials and to heads of
departments, agencies, and other major offices. All
positions so designated as being exempt shall be
listed in the rules and regulations promulgated
under this act by the job title and department or

mmmmmmmmmmmm
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agency, and any change in such exempt status, shall
constitute an amendment to said rules and regulations.ff
The obvious reason for the appellant's omission of the last
sentence of the foregoing paragraph is the fact that some affirmative
action on the part of the Merit System Council was necessary to exempt
people who would fit within the classification of persons designated
in that subparagraph, and obviously court reporters are not on that
list.
The appellant goes on to state in its brief that "clerks and
reporters of the court'1 have such a confidential relationship with the
judges for whom they work that they must be covered by Subparagraph (4),
Court clerks are, however, Merit System employees under the county
Merit System provided for by Title 17-13-1 et. seq., Utah Code Annotatec
and there are no exemptions from the county Merit System for court
clerks, and court clerks are Merit System employees.
The appellant then seeks to find refuge in the provisions of
Title 78-56-1.1, Utah Code Annotated, which is the part of the code
dealing with court reporters and stenographers.

That provision states:

"The court administrator shall appoint a
certified shorthand reporter with the approval of
the district judge to report the proceedings in
each division of the district courts. The certified
shorthand reporter shall hold office during the
pleasure of the court administrator and the district
judge."
The appellant relies upon that statute in an attempt to
establish a confidential relationship that would place court reporters
under the provisions of Title 67-13-6 (a)(4), making the court reporter

mm
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such an office that has personal and confidential relationship.

How-

ever, once again, the appellant fails to read all of Subsection (4),
and particularly that part that requires all such positions so designated as being exempt to be listed in the rules and regulations promulgated under the act by the job title and department or agency where
the exemption is to be honored.
The appellant would then ask the court to distinguish the
statutes and hold that Title 67-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, is a general
statute, and that Title 78-56-1.1, Utah Code Annotated is a specific
statute.

What makes general general and specific specific?

Is not the

1971 amendment to Title 67-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, specific?

Does

it not specifically enumerate a new section or group of employees that
shall be covered under the Merit System of the State of Utah?

Does it

not specifically state that employees of the judiciary shall be covered
by the provisions of the Merit System?
The appellants distinction between a general statute and a
specific statute is a fictional distinction, and nothing more.
Respondent agrees with the statement of law contained on
Page 8 of the appellant's brief, citing from two Utah cases, namely,
in re Utah Savings and Loan Association, 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 Pacific
2d 929 (1968); and University of Utah vs. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59
Pacific 96 (1899).

The respondent further believes that the two

statutes that the appellant claims are in conflict can be reconciled,
and that a reasonable construction can be given to both.

If, however,
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the court believes they cannot be reconciled, and that reasonable
construction cannot be given to both, then the court has, on at least
two prior occasions, ruled that the statute passed later in time
governs and is controlling over the earlier statute.
The Utah Supreme Court in Pacific Intermountain Express
Company vs. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d. 15, 316 Pacific 2d. 549,
where the court states:
n WoV

' Also supporting this view are the
basic rules pertaining to statutory construction.
That, in case of conflict, a later enactment is
controlling over an earlier one; and that express
provisions of statutes take preference over
general ones.!f
To the same effect, see Nelden vs. Clark, 20 Utah 382,
59 Pacific 524; and Bateman vs. Board of Examiners of the State of
Utah, 7 Utah 2d. 221, 322 Pacific 2d. 381.
Title 78-56-1.1, Utah Code Annotated, properly gives the
court administrator and each individual district judge the right to
appoint a court reporter to a district court judge to meet his satisfaction and desire.

That principle does not, however, conflict with t

tenure of a court reporter to serve as a Merit System employee of the
State of Utah.

Even before the Merit System Act was amended in 1975

to include court reporters, it was apparently the court administrator1
position that the provisions of Title 78-56-1.1 were to allow job
security for reporters who became members of a court reporter pool,
yet allowing each district judge to select from the pool the court
reporter he desired.

By letter on Supreme Court stationery dated
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November 13, 1969, by L.M. Cummings, as court administrator, and
approved by The Honorable A.H. Ellett, assignment justice (R.15), the
court administrator stated:
"Under former law, a judge hired his court
reporter who served during the pleasure of the
judge. This law was very unfair to a reporter who
had established his home and maintained a standard
of living in the community, for when his judge died,
the reporter was not continued on the payroll and
could not be paid by the state of Utah. The law has
now been amended so that the reporters are all hired
by the court administrator who consults with the
judge and has the judge's permission before hiring
a reporter for the particular judge. However, in
case of death of the judge, the reporter still works
for the state of Utah, and is entitled to his salary.
He, likewise, is subject to be called by the court
administrator into different courts when he is not
working for his judge."
Even before the 1971 amendment to the Merit System Act in
which court reporters were placed under the Merit System, and interpretation had been given to the Court Administrator Act and, particularly Section 78-56-1.1, declaring a policy of tenure for court
reporters so that they would not be left out in the cold with the
death of their judge.

Thereafter, the Mandatory Retirement Act for

judges was passed, and the retention of court reporters on payroll
of the state of Utah became even more important; because their status,
under prior law, could have been changed by either of two events;
namely, the death of their judge or the retirement of their judge.
The two statutes in question can be reconciled, in that the
Merit System Statute gives court reporters Merit System status
and the Court Administrator Act gives the court administrator the

m
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authority to control the work of the court reporters, the judge for
whom they shall work (with that judge's approval), and the fixing of
their vacations, and the like.

They are employees of the State of

Utah under the Merit System, but are subject to the control of the
court administrator for the promotion of better judicial administration.
If the acts can be reconciled; then, by all means, they
should be, and it is submitted that the foregoing reconciliation is a
feasible one.

If they cannot, however, be reconciled, then the most

recently passed statute governs; and the 1971 amendment to the Merit
System Act takes precedence over the 1969 enactment of the Court Administrator Act.
II.
THE APPELLANT CANNOT TAKE REFUGE IN ITS DERELICTION
OF DUTY IN FAILING TO HAVE THE RESPONDENT CERTIFIED
UNDER THE SYSTEM.
The appellant asks that the District Court's judgment be
reversed because it, the appellant, failed to follow the mandate of
the Legislature in either discharging the respondent before she was
sandwiched into the Merit System, or certifying her into the Merit
System.
In dealing with that direct question at the trial court
level, the following dialogue went on between Judge Hansan and the
appellant's attorney on Pages 14 and 15 of the reporter's transcript
of hearing as follows:
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"THE COURT: Let's assume, just for the purpose
of argument, that Subparagraph (g) , amendment to
67-13-6, did, in fact, place court reporters under
the Merit System. That would have occurred in 1971,
or May of 1971. Now, the date that the particular
employee falls within the class covered, goes under
the Merit System, would be as of that date, would it
not?
MR. NELSON: Yes. Then again, under the rules
and regulations, there would have been a particular
time in which they had to be certified, if, in fact,
they were covered or intended to be covered.
THE COURT: All right. Now, letfs assume
again that court reporters were intended to be covered,
but that no certification was made for any reporter
at that time or any time thereafter. Now, does this
mean that in spite of the intention of the Legislature,
that employee can be dismissed in a manner contrary to
the provisions of the Merit System.
MR. NELSON: No, your Honor. I believe that
all that was done or was not done in this particular
case was under the theory that they were not covered.
If this court, or the highest court of this state were
to say that they were covered under statute, I believe
that this would have to be followed through. And again,
the time element somehow would have to be prolonged, the
department would still have to, I think, affirmatively
take some action on it. In direct answer to your question, if it were determined that they were covered in
that original act of the Legislature in 1971, I believe
it would be our position that surely they would be given
the opportunity to come in. But I think again, from all
that has taken placie, and all that has not taken place,
it would indicate, at least, that there was either no
intention, or someone was not interested, or at least
some four years had gone by and the Legislature surely
should be given the enlightenment that they have certain laws on the books; and, if they wanted to change
them as the court reporters are not now under the
System, they could have done something about it. I
think so. I think again under construction, if we
have got something that has been a condition for some
period of time, not hid under a bushel of some kind,
to think that the Legislature had the intention that
these particular court reporters should be under it,
I think would be stretching far beyond the practice
showed.
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THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further
Mr. Bennett?
MR. BENNETT: I think, in a nutshell, what
the State's position is, is that if we did not do
it after the Legislature told us to do it the first
time, they had a duty to come back and tell us to
do it a second time; and I just don't think that is
tenable
The State, on appeal, somewhat abandons the position they
took in the District Court of saying that the Legislature should have
reenacted the 1971 amendment because the Merit System Council did not
take the necessary action to certify court reporters into the system,
and point out that there are certain certification procedures under
the statute that possibly should have been followed.

In that regard,

they cite Title 67-13-6 (b)(2) and (3). Those particular provisions,
as cited by the appellant in its brief, have reference particularly
to Schedule C which states as follows:
M

The non-competitive schedule, consisting
of all positions for which it is not feasible to
administer competitive examinations at entry.
Following satisfactory completion of at least a
year probationary period, employees under this
schedule shall receive tenure.M
Inasmuch as the Merit System Council did not take affirmative
action to declare the court reporters on a competitive schedule, it
can only be assumed that they were considered to be on a non-competitive
schedule for which the administration of examinations was not necessary.
Therefore, upon completion of one year in service after the 1971
amendment became effective in May of 1971, the court reporters would
have received tenure, which would have been in May, 1972, The respon-
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dent continued to hold her position until January, 1973, several
months after she would have received tenure.
The State has not raised the defense, either in their
pleadings or in their contentions, that the respondent was anything but
a very efficient and competent court reporter.
primarily that the

appellant

Their position is

failed to follow their own procedures

to certify court reporters into the Merit System and, by doing so,
were able to defeat the legislative mandate.

If that were the case,

and if they were allowed to profit by their own inaction, then the
legislative branch of government of the State of Utah might just as
well be disbanded because some administrative department head has an
absolute right to veto the legislative enactments of the State of
Utah.

That cannot be the law under our republican form of government.
The only Merit System regulations relied upon by the

appellant are those referred to on Page 14 of their brief, which are
dated December 1, 1973, and which are apparently still in effect.

The

problem with those regulations is that they were passed many months
after the respondent was discharged from her position in January of
1973.

The appellant cannot claim the benefit of regulations passed

long after their misdeed.
CONCLUSIONS
The District Court was correct in ruling that the respondent
was, on January 31, 1973, a covered employee under the Merit System
Act of the State of Utah, which, through its amendment in 1971, with
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the changes in Section 67-13-6 (a)(8), and the changes and additions
in Section 67-13-6 (g), incorporated official court reporter serving
the district courts in the State of Utah and to the Merit System of
the State of Utah; and that, from the effective date of that act in
May, 1971, court reporters, serving in the district courts, became
covered employees under said Merit System, and the District Court's rulin
should be adopted by the Supreme Court.
Respectfully submitted,

^jJj~JUtliL. <~/L~J3fc~
WENDELL E. BENNETT
A t t o r n e y for Respondent
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